

























90. We experience our consciousness as a field in which objects, thoughts, feelings, volitions and actions are presented. Formally we can say nothing other than this about it.

91. The field of consciousness or sentience we grasp immediately when we turn our consciousness upon itself is felt as a dynamic field, a field of motion-possibilities or actualities. This field is infinite. Why do we say so?

92. Because every finite thing known in consciousness may be represented by a sphere or circle which simultaneously includes and excludes space. It includes a finite space; it excludes an infinite space, and in being conscious of a circle our consciousness always goes outside it as well as inside it. To be conscious of a circle as a circumscribing contour enclosing a space is to be conscious also of the space beyond. In seeing that the edge of a coin is an edge we are conscious also that beyond this edge is space. The space beyond the circumscribing contour is infinite.

93. Infinity as such cannot be pluralised. What does this mean? It means that the concept of plurality depends upon the existence of finites. A thing may be said to be a unity if it requires only one contour to circumscribe it. If more than one contour is required to circumscribe a thing, then that thing must be said to be a plurality. Many things are pluralities in unity; that is, they are constituted by many little circumscribing contours held together by one large, all-containing contour. Our own body may be said to be a unity insofar as one circumscribing line (our skin) holds it together. But internally the presence of subsidiary binding contours differentiating one organ from another, or one cell group or cell from another, compels us to see ourselves internally as a plurality, a fact important in determining the nature of certain disorders, schizophrenia, etc.

94. As infinity cannot be pluralised it follows that there cannot be two or more infinities. We must not here be misled by certain mathematical concepts of different infinite series of numbers, as, for instance, the 'infinite' series of odd numbers 1,3,5,7, etc., and the 'infinite' series of even numbers 2,4,6,8, etc. The whole number series is simply the mechanical result of the use of certain mathematical terms which are themselves finite insofar as they include and exclude the significance of other terms.

95. As there cannot be a plurality of infinities it follows that whatever is shown to be infinite must belong to the non-plural ultimate infinite. For example, the space beyond any finite circumscribed zone is



infinite. If we remove the circumscribing contour that finites a zone, space is infinite absolutely.

96. Absolute space is infinite. But we have seen that sentience is also infinite, for it is not itself a form, and limitation is form. Forms are finite. Sentience is not a form or finite. It is infinite. No matter how large a circle we may conceive we are always conscious of the possibility of conceiving a larger one beyond it, for infinity lies beyond all circumscribed zones whatever.

97. Absolute space is infinite. Sentience is infinite. There cannot be a plurality of infinities. Therefore the words 'absolute space' and 'sentience' both refer to the ultimate infinity of which we must assert them to be properties.

98. But not only absolute space and sentience must be asserted to be properties of the ultimate infinite source of things. Motion as such is also infinite.

99. Finite things are constituted of rotatory motions and act upon each other by translatory motions. Rotatory motions produce finite zones of rotation; pure translating motions propagate themselves infinitely. As rotatory motions depend on translations round a point such that the motions return on themselves, so pure translating motions traverse space without returning upon themselves, and are thus infinite.

100. There cannot be a plurality of infinities. We must therefore assert that the ultimate infinite source of things has as its properties not only absolute space and sentience, but also motion. Do we need to find further concepts to stand as the ground for understanding the phenomena of existence and being?

101. Space may be defined as that in which motion may demonstrate itself, for motion is change of place and place is in and of space. Motion is that which occupies and traverses space and produces by its rotatory mode the things of the world, and by its translatory mode the mutual interaction of things. Sentience is that which knows these modes of motion, or things and interactions.

102. Space, motion, sentience; all are infinite. A plurality of infinities is ultimately impossible. Space, motion and sentience must be asserted to be properties of the ultimate infinite source of all things. Do we need further basic concepts to describe the world we experience? No. Space, motion and sentience and the ultimate infinite are sufficient to explain all phenomena.



103. Sentience is that property of the ultimate infinite whereby it knows whatever motion presents within it as form or interaction of forms.

104. Motion is that which brings into existence the world of things and their interactions which sentience knows.

105. Space is that in which motion takes place and which is felt by sentience as the infinite environment of finite things.

106. All three are properties of the ultimate infinite source of all things. We may say that the ultimate infinite source of all things is an infinite sentient motion occupying infinite space and producing from its properties the world of things and events we experience.

107. There is nowhere that infinity is not. The ultimate infinity is sentient motion. Therefore there is nowhere in infinite space where sentience and motion are not. "If thou goest into the deepest depths, I am there. If thou goest up to the highest heights, I am there." There is nowhere where the infinite sentient motion is not.

108. What does sentience experience? Simply the form of motion occupying any place or traversing space. Where motion has a pure translatory character, sentience feels this motion as a simple going to no end, a kind of eternal flowing having no object towards which to flow.

109. Where motion has a rotatory character sentience experiences this motion as an object located in space, or occupying a place. 'Place' means a space in which some objective form is posited. 'Pace' means the distance between two places and also the time taken to traverse it.

110. Pure translatory motion is infinite and therefore non-finite, non-individuated. What sentience feels in the pure translation of motion is no objective thing. What sentience experiences in the place marked out by a rotator motion is an object, an individuated form, a zone of finite characterized motion functioning from its motion characteristics in a definite, special manner.

111. The essential of the individual state of motion is form or circumscribing action. Individuation is characteristic formal limitation. The consciousness in a given zone of individuating motion refers to that motion as an individual thing or being. Thus the consciousness in the place of a man's body in certain circumstance refers to that body as to an individual reference centre. Whatever the characteristic rotator motion forms occupying a given place and constituting a body or reference centre for consciousness, consciousness refers to these characteristic motion forms as the individuality of that body.



112. One body differs from another insofar as their constituent characteristic motions differ. Is it possible for two different bodies to have exactly identical motion characteristics? No.

113. For two bodies to be two bodies they must be differentiated in some manner, if only in the two different places they occupy or have occupied. For two bodies to be exactly identical they would have to have had identical histories up to the moment of being compared, and this is impossible, for each body would have had to come into existence at exactly the same time in exactly the same place, and have kept in phase with each other moment by moment. But for two bodies to fulfill these conditions is impossible. It is meaningless to assert that two bodies can come into existence simultaneously in identical place and time. 'Two' implies differentiation, and differentiation under such conditions is impossible. Only one being can occupy a unique place-time in one moment.

114. We stress this fact because of the tendency of certain statistical thinkers to apply the results of their researches to unique individuals who cannot possibly be covered by the findings.

115. Individuality is formal characteristic limitation of being. No two individual beings can be exactly alike in all respects, a fact that calls for the exercise of care in communication between individuals.

116. The consciousness in the place marked out by certain formal characteristic motions has these motions as the content of its consciousness. All its thoughts, feelings, volitions, actions and experiences are merely the play of the constituent motions of this place.

117. But we see from the confused responses of certain individuals that sentience in them is not formally and reflexively aware of this fact. Many people are so identified with a given behavior pattern of the body they use as a centre of reference for consciousness that they consider this pattern to be essential to their being and unalterable. They do not see it as a motion-complex. They do not see motion as change. Therefore they tend to maintain the behaviour pattern established in the body as if it constituted sentience itself and not merely a characteristic motion within it.

118. What is identification? How does sentience tie itself to certain forms so that it becomes conditioned by them?

119. Quite simply we may say that sentience may identify with a form as soon as it finds that form to be the occasion of pleasure.



120. Sentience is feeling power. Feeling may be either pleasant or painful or indeterminate. What determines which of these it shall be?

121. Certain motions have characteristics which give rise to pleasure in the place where they occur. Such motions may have been initiated in that place or they may have arisen elsewhere and been transmitted there.

122. Pleasure-producing motions in general are smoothly undulatory or gently pulsatory. Sharp angular motions or violent pulsations normally do not produce pleasure.

123. The idea behind the word used in Yoga-philosophy for bliss conveys the notion of an uninterrupted, smoothly undulatory and gently impulsive motion. This is one of the meanings also of the word 'heaven' held by certain religionists.

124. Let us look for a moment at a given individual being. It can retain its forms and absorb motion only in certain definite amounts over a certain period of time. If motion is added to it in too large amounts or in too short a time its absorption capacity may fail. When this happens it either suffers a radical change of form or disintegrates, partially or wholly.

125. Sentience in the place where a body begins to disintegrate or suffer too violent a change of form, if identified with that body, suffers pain or distress.

126. Where a body is able easily to absorb any motions originating in itself or coming to it from outside, sentience experiences a degree of pleasure and tends to identify with the pleasure and pleasure-producing motions.

127. Identification is simply the concentration of sentience on a given motion or motion-complex because of its effect on sentience.

128. We can easily understand why sentience identifies with pleasure producing motions or motion-complexes; but we also observe it identified with pain or distress-producing motions.

129. If sentience has experienced a certain motion or motion-complex as pain-producing, it tends to remain on guard against a possible recurrence of the experience. As identification is simply concentration on a thing, a motion, or motion-complex, sentience tends to identify not only with pleasure-producing motions it might desire to re-





experience, but also with pain and distress-producing motions and motion-complexes that it feels itself necessary to guard against.

130. There is a very peculiar fact about the way sentience reacts to pain producing motions. It does not wish to experience them again, and therefore tries to repress them, but also wishing to avoid them, it keeps itself aware of them in order to avoid them. It refuses to re-experience them or clearly to formulate them, yet it keeps itself always on the alert at certain levels in case they are re-presented. Thus we have the strange fact that individually identified sentience may be simultaneously aware and not aware of certain motion possibilities which may be actualised either from within itself or from outside.

131. Individually identified sentience may be called the psyche or soul. Sentient motion non-individuated may be called spirit. Such a usage of the words corresponds quite closely with their usage in early philosophical and religious systems.

132. Absolutely non-identified infinite sentience motion corresponds with the philosophical concept of the absolute as treated in the Advaita philosophy of Shankara. As a religious concept it corresponds with the Infinite Spirit, or the God-head in Christianity.

133. Sentience apparently finited (but only apparently) by identification with a finite motion-complex or individual body, corresponds with the individuated self of certain philosophers, or with the soul of religious thinkers.

134. Whatever the character of a given motion-complex constituting an individual body or organism, such is the *apparent* character of the sentience identified with it. Yet the sentience is never really one with the body. In the strongly identified state it may believe itself to be so. It may struggle and fail to break identification with the body, but its failure is determined by the mass inertia of its previous will to identify, a will which has aimed at the experience of certain pleasures and the avoidance of certain pains.

135. There is no inertia other than the inertia of established will. Inertia means motion working within a system or motion-complex. 'Will' is the term we use for sentient motion at the point where it initiates an act. The motion put into the act we call energy. The continuance of this motion we call inertia. There is no inertia other than established will. To realise this is to gain the possibility of extricating sentience from identification.



136. Why can we not ordinarily extricate ourselves immediately from identification? Because to do so we require an amount of energy equivalent to that which we put in in the identification process. We do not always realise this. We make little efforts to overthrow the big effects of the identification energies. When we do not succeed with our little efforts, we tend to give up the attempt as hopeless. Sometimes we have so little energy available that even putting all we have into the struggle fails to release us.

137. Energies we need to help us to break identification may be locked inside us, constituting the very identification we are trying to break.

138. When this happens we need help. Anyone who does not understand the principles governing identification may fall into it.

139. Sentience identified with a badly integrated motion-complex or body may suffer from the discordant relations of its constituent motions. Such sentience, self-conditioned by its self-identification, may be unable to rescue itself from the effect imposed upon it by its body, and may suffer intensely physically and mentally.

140. The field of sentient motion is infinite. Yet it has the power to concentrate upon any zone within itself. When it does so it tends to enter into identification with that zone. The more it works within the chosen zone, the more energy it involves into that zone, the more mass inertia it contains and usually the harder it is to break identification with that zone.

141. When sentient motion at first involves itself into a zone and identifies with it, it does so because that zone contains certain formal possibilities or actualities such that sentience feels its own self-involvement to be profitable to it. Certain motion-characteristics give rise to pleasure. With these sentience tends to identify. If such motions occur continuously for a long period of time sentient motion involves itself more and more in them. The involvement may be so intense and so prolonged that consciousness of the real nature of sentience may lapse relatively (actually, be obscured by the motions with which it is identified).

142. When this happens, sentience believes itself inextricably bound up with the motions with which it is identified. It believes they constitute its very own being and that they are not just motions originating in that zone or elsewhere at some earlier time.

143. Most people, when they look inside their minds to see what is there, identify more or less strongly with their mental content. They believe the ideas and feelings they experience are their *own* ideas and



feelings. They do not see ideas and feelings as forms of motion which might occur anywhere throughout the infinite field of sentient motion. They see them as "my ideas", "my feelings".

144. We do not often find a man conversing with us and saying, "There is a formal motion presented at this moment in the place of this being, from which is arising a tendency for this being to activate itself in a certain way." More often we hear, "I've got an idea and think it would be a good thing for me to do something." Yet the first formulation is truer to the facts and would result in more efficient action.

145. Identification binds the self as effectively in action as if the self were really bound to the foams with which it is identified.

146. The breaking of the identification with the forms of motion complexes returns sentience to itself. In terms of the individuated or identified sentience which we call a psyche, soul or self, breaking identification with certain particular forms might be acceptable, but breaking identification absolutely might appear to be equivalent to the loss of the individual self. In a certain sense it is, but we should say rather that the individual self is loosed rather than lost. Sentience itself, which is the essence of the self; cannot be lost. It may be loosed from identification with formal motion complexes.

147. What is sentience in its absolutely non-identified state? We are here in the realm of abstract ideas. The fact is that sentience is not experienced existentially without some degree of identification. Existential experience implies a degree of identification with some motion-form.

148. If we ask what is the state of the absolutely non-identified sentient motion of the infinite, we have to say that what sentience here knows is no finite, no circumscribed object, no *thing* whatever. It knows only pure, absolute motion unconditioned by any finiting process whatever; objectless feeling propagating itself to no end. From all finite standpoints we have to say that the absolutely non-identified state is beyond all finite significance or meaning. But we must remind ourselves that such absolute non-identification is an abstract idea, a concept so far removed from the realm of individuated beings, that for them it offers no more than the idea of the possibility of the infinite transcendence of all identification states whatever, a possibility of not much interest to identified selves, except in extremely rare cases. Yogis and saints may seek such infinite transcendence. Business men and politicians and other purposeful persons ordinarily do not.



149. The absolutely non-identified state does not constitute a problem to itself. A problem exists only for consciousness identified with a motion complex.

150. A problem is something put forward for discussion. The Greek 'problema' means throwing or casting forward before one's eyes. Present sentience with a finite motion in such a manner that it is led into identification, and a problem exists for it.

151. In the infinite motion of the absolute are contained all possible modes of motion in a non-separated manner. An illustration of this may be seen in the motions traversing the sea.

152. What is for all practical purposes a continuum of water is able to transmit motions simultaneously in all directions. We see waves traveling in every direction. We see the generation of vortices at the intersection points of waves. We see motion-complexes of every kind appearing and disappearing. Becoming and being and unbecoming; birth, life and death; all foreshadow themselves here. And this is only visible to us on the surface. The same processes are occurring in the depths, only less obviously, less violently, except for the phenomenon of the breaking wave, the spume and spray of which arise from the interaction of the sea and the air.

153. The motions of the sea below its surface illustrate what we mean by non-separate motion modes. Here below the surface in the continuum of the water every motion influences and is influenced by every other motion; no motion is completely separated from another.

154. In the same way, in the infinite sentient motion of the absolute, all possible motions propagate themselves; every conceivable direction of motion is there simultaneously, waves of all lengths and periodicities traverse infinite space, intersect, create zones of turbulence, vortices, motion-complexes of every conceivable kind.

155. These motions in the infinite constitute all conceivable experiences of sentience or consciousness. Everything whatever that has been experienced, is being experienced, or may be experienced is contained in the infinite motion of the Absolute. The whole of world history is there, the whole of evolution, and the involution which preceded it; every minutest act of the least of beings, all is there comprehended in the absolute motion of infinity.

156. The infinite motion of the Absolute is the mirror into which the seers of the world have looked, the mirror which confers upon him who looks into it the power of prophecy, the ability to look backwards and



forwards in time-space, the power to know the Alpha and Omega of all being.

157. Why does sentience abandon the infinite motion and enter into identification with finite motion-complexes? It does so initially for some profit to itself.

158. At this point we must exercise great care to avoid misunderstanding.

159. If we look at one of our hands we can do a little experiment to make ourselves conscious of certain facts about sentience or consciousness. If we look at our hand we can make ourselves conscious of it as a whole, or as a whole with parts, or we can make ourselves conscious of its parts separately. This power of sentience is very strange, yet we have to accept it, because we experience it. We can spread our consciousness over the whole hand and see it non-analytically as a whole; we can see the whole hand and at the same time be conscious that it comprises fingers and thumb and palm and so on; and we can concentrate on one part of our hand, finger, thumb, palm, etc., so intensely that the rest of the hand appears to lapse from consciousness. Yet the fact that we can remember the rest of the hand at will shows that it has not totally lapsed.

160. Sentience, then, is able to make itself equally conscious of all its constituent motions and motion-complexes, or to make itself unequally aware of them; or both simultaneously.

161. The Absolute, Infinite, Sentient Motion is ultimately all there is. There is nowhere where it is not, and as Time is a function of motion, there is no time where it is not.

162. Because it is sentient the Absolute knows what is occurring within itself. Because it is infinite motion it contains within itself all conceivable motions, motion-complexes and relations, and therefore all beings and events. Because one of its motion capacities is concentration, or motion centred on a point or locus, or upon any sub-locus within a larger one; just as we can concentrate on our hand as a whole and yet be conscious that it comprises finger, thumb, palm, etc.

163. The Absolute, Infinite, Sentient Motion is conscious of itself absolutely, wholly, and in all the loci or places within itself individually. Its sentience is in no way reduced from its infinite into finity. The Absolute Sentience remains absolutely sentient, even when within itself specific zones are super-stressed in an individual act of identification.



164. Whenever identification of sentience with a finite motion-complex occurs, this identification in no way reduces Infinite Sentience from its infinite level.

165. William Blake talks of, "Smiling the smile." There is a smile behind all smiles, *the* smile of the Absolute, Infinite, Sentient Motion. This smile is infinite and eternal. It is there behind every private smile and behind every tear, behind every private joy and every sorrow. It is the smile we feel stealing over our face when we are in particular situations which give us no occasion to smile.

166. The Absolute smiles because it is absolute, because it absolutely transcends all finite aspects of its motion, whilst simultaneously comprehending them. It smiles because not only does it know each motion from within itself, but also all motions and infinite absolute motion. And as this motion constitutes all beings and relations and events whatever, the Absolute is omniscient and omnipotent throughout its infinity. Omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, infinite and eternal, the Absolute smiles not without reason. It is that to which the greatest of human minds have paid homage, the Supreme Godhead of religionists, the Unknown God of the Greeks, the Absolute of the philosophers, the King of kings to all rulers, the Saviour of the people, and the secret fear-object of all beings of private purpose.

167. There is nowhere where the infinite is not. Therefore sentience is everywhere; omniscience and omnipotence are everywhere.

168. Wherever an individual being is, there is sentience and there is the infinite absolute. Why does not the infinite confer upon each motion-complex within itself omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence?

169. When Jesus asked John the Baptist to baptise him with water, John said that he was not worthy to do it. Jesus replied, "Nevertheless do it, for thus it becomes to fulfill all righteousness." What did he mean?

170. Baptism with water symbolises the entrance of a being into material or substantial existence. John signifies Intellect. To be baptised by John the Baptist means to immerse one's intellect in material existence, to use one's analytical power in the world of matter.

171. The Absolute contains all possibilities, and in order to fulfill itself must actualise them. One of the possibilities of action is the entrance of Intellect into the material world. Not to do this would be to leave one of the Absolute's potentialities un-actualised. The man who wishes to attain to the Absolute must comprehend all things. Hence the



words of Jesus to John the Baptist. Jesus aimed at Absoluteness, therefore He willed to fulfill the necessary pre-conditions of it. Between the Alpha and the Omega are many steps. Jesus was self-determined to tread them all.

172. If the Absolute conferred infiniteness on all finity they would cease to exist as finites. As finites are known to be such only by finite identification of sentience with them, and identification is willed initially only for some profit, what is the profit to sentience of identification with a finite?

173. We have seen that certain motion-forms, smoothly undulatory or gently pulsating may give rise to pleasure and thus incline sentience to identify with them. Is there any other motivation for the act of identification?

174. Freud saw pleasure as the motivating purpose behind action. "Was fur eine Freude!"

175. Adler saw power as the motivating purpose behind action. "Mein Adler, meine schlange, and ich."

176. Jung saw the collective unconscious at work behind action. "Du bist so sehr Jung."

177. Pleasure, power, the will to belong and participate in the eternal, three reasons for identification, each showing its own peculiar profit.

178. Identification with smoothly undulatory or gently pulsatory motion induces sensations of pleasure.

179. Identification with situations in which one has power over others induces the sense of dominion and indestructibility.

180. Identification with the collective life of the race induces the sense of participation and belongingness and security.

181. Once identification with a finite has occurred, sentience in that place tends to maintain it. We all know the tendency to hand on to that to which we have committed ourselves. If a thing has given us pleasure, so will the memory of it. As we tend to retain a thing, so we tend to retain the memory of it.



182. We must here note an implication of finite identification. When sentience identifies itself with a given finite, it places itself on the level of that finite and deprives itself of all data beyond the sphere of that finite.

183. To identify fully with a finite is to lose for practical purposes the infinite. Full identification with a finite deprives sentience of information concerning other finites not immediately implied in it. Finite knowledge identification induces infinite ignorance. In total identification with finites omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence are lost.

184. Once omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence are lost sentience, identified with a finite, feels itself deprived, deficient and in bondage. It continues in this state until the accumulation of obstacles within itself make its state no longer sufficiently profitable to make it worth while to stay in, it. Then it begins to seek a way out. If it does not find one, it becomes negative and then lapses from identification negatively. If it finds a way out it becomes positive and breaks its identification positively.

185. When sentience lapses negatively from identification with an unpleasant situation, it retains a negative resonance which constitutes for it what we may call an unpleasant shadow. This shadow covers sentience with a pall and orientates sentience towards or away from situations bearing certain relations to the situations giving rise to the negativity. In this way sentience may be so orientated that it moves always away from what it most needs to help it to extricate itself, and towards that which will result in the re-experience of situations similar to those which already bind it in negativity.

186. When sentience breaks identification positively it does so by transcending the situation with which it was identified. It does this by seeing through the situation, by exhausting its meaning, by gaining from it what lesson it had to teach.

187. The parable of the prodigal son is a story about identification and its results. Sentience has two aspects, one identified, one not identified. The prodigal son was identified with a series of experiences which led him at last to eating husks with swine (which means occupying oneself with externals and obstinate people). After meditation upon his experiences, he said to himself, "I have missed my real aim, ("sin" means "miss the mark") I will return to my source." On returning to his father, that is, his source, he was feasted and his return celebrated. Why? Because he was now of more value than his brother who had not gone out, as is evidenced by the bad response his brother made to his return. The stay-at-home brother had avoided identification for negative reasons. He did not like the discomforts of finite identification. He would





have hated his neighbours to see him consorting with swine. The prodigal, on the other hand, had discovered a value in husks and swine. For him they were the point of return to his source. External things and relations and obstinate, obtuse people tend to incline us back to our own centre.

188. We will have more to say about this in the chapter on reflexive self-consciousness, the return of sentience to itself. *(This appears to be a reference to Eugene Halliday's essay 'Reflexive Self-Consciousness' which was produced separately by the IHS. It is entirely possible then, that this 'Psychotherapy' essay was written some time before this, or at least around the same time - BH )*

189. In dealing with mentally sick people a method has to be found of converting a negative lapse from identification with an unpleasant or painful situation into a positive breaking of identification and transcending of the problem.

190. The negative lapse always leaves a resonance behind it which orientates sentience and conditions attitudes and behaviour.

191. The positive breaking of identification frees sentience from the situation and allows it to re-orientate itself, unconditioned by its experience, so that it can choose either to remain unidentified or re-affirm identification with any situation.

192. For sentience to be unconditioned by its experience might seem to those of apprehensive mind to be undesirable or dangerous, for, think they, sentience unconditioned by its experience might re-commit the same errors over and over again. But sentience unconditioned by its experience can if necessary re-enter any situation either to re-assess certain aspects of it, or to show other identified sentience how to extricate itself; as did Jesus when he went to hell.

193. Sentience or consciousness unconditioned by its experience is not exactly the same as sentience which has never had an experience. Sentience which has never identified with a finite has not yet been conditioned by experience. Sentience which is identified with experience is conditioned by it. Sentience which has been identified and conditioned by its identification and which has extricated itself from identification, is no longer conditioned, but it still has the information gained during its identification, so that although it is unconditioned and therefore free, it can still act intelligently in relation to situations similar to those experienced, and it can, if it wills to do so for any reason, act intelligently in it, and again come out of it without suffering any ill-consequences, or becoming again conditioned by it.



194. The method of positively breaking identification is based on an understanding of how identification initially occurs.

195. We have seen that sentience tends to identify with motions or motion-complexes (situation or experiences) wherever there arises a degree of pleasure. We have seen also that identification tends to occur with any motion or motion-complex which gives pain or distress, this identification serving as a method of standing on guard against a possible repetition of the painful or distressing experience.

196. Thus we see that pleasure-producing experiences tend to orientate sentience towards them and to lead it again into similar experiences, and pain-producing experiences orientate sentience to avoid them.

197. We must remind ourselves that the body or organism with which sentience identifies itself is a motion-complex. A finite motion-complex has only finite assimilation capacity. If motion is inserted too fast or in any other inassimilable way into a finite body, the constituent motions of that body are either forced to alter their pattern or are disintegrated. In either case the sentience identified with the body suffers. The altering of the pattern is experienced as a disorientating or distressing emotion, and the disintegration is experienced as a falling apart of the self, a corruption or death process.

198. Disintegration of the motion-complex may occur either partially or totally. Mental patients often complain that "something is dying" in them, or say, "I feel as if I am dying!" This statement springs out of the partial disintegration they feel to be occurring within the organism with which they are identified.

199. It has been said that no problem is ever solved, but only transcended. This is true in the sense that sentience, in order to solve a problem, must extricate itself from identification with the motion-complex which constitutes the problem.

200. When sentience is totally identified with a motion-complex, or body, or organism, it cannot extricate itself from it, for it feels itself identical with that motion-complex.

201. To be released from total identification with a body or process the sentience identified needs help from other sentience.